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We use a unique and comprehensive data set on open-end real estate funds
in Germany to study a liquidity crisis that hit this industry between 2005
and 2006. Since this industry is comparably unregulated our data set per-
mits us to contrast competing explanations of liquidity crisis. We ￿nd that
fundamental factors matter for the liquidity out￿ow in normal times. During
the crisis, however, they do not play a role. During the panic only strategic
complementarities drive withdrawals. Furthermore, we ￿nd that funds with
a higher load fee su￿er from substantially larger out￿ows in the crisis period,
while a higher load fee reduces gross out￿ows in normal times. As institu-
tional investors predominately invest in funds with a low load fee this is in
line with recent theory arguing that complementarities are mitigated by the
involvement of large institutional investors who can at least partially correct
for the coordination failure resulting from complementarities.
Keyword Liquidity Crisis, Runs, Strategic Complementarities
JEL: G11, G12, G14, G23Non-Technical Summary
The lack of liquidity, though not the origin, is at least an important ampli￿er of
￿nancial crises. Liquidity risks on the balance sheet of various ￿nancial intermedi-
aries also played a crucial role in spreading the subprime crisis. As a consequence
there are growing demands for a stronger regulation of liquidity risk, in particular
for higher regulatory liquidity requirements for banks.
However, from an academic perspective it is far from clear whether a higher
regulatory liquidity ratio is indeed preferable or not. One main perspective taken
in the literature for instance argues that banking crises are mainly driven by bad
fundamentals or bad performance of banks. Although banks’ liquidity transforma-
tion increases the destabilizing e￿ect of a bad performance, it is exactly this greater
fragility which serves as an important device to discipline the bank management
according to this view. Only the threat that a bad performance leads to massive
liquidity out￿ows, to a crisis at the respective bank and ultimately to a job loss
incentivizes the bank management to do the best they can to improve the bank’s
performance. A high regulatory liquidity holding undermines this threat and pre-
dominantly impairs banks’ e￿ciency.
An opposing view suggests that a higher liquidity ratio can reduce destabilizing
self-enforcing e￿ects. The larger the liquidity transformation of a ￿nancial interme-
diary (the more illiquid and long-term the assets relative to the liabilities) the larger
the fear of investors that the long-term return of their claims is reduced by a large
scale withdrawal by other investors. Accordingly, if investors expect massive with-
drawals by others, they have a strong incentive to withdraw their funds themselves.
The expectations of a (liquidity) crisis become self-ful￿lling. A higher liquidity ratio
contains these self-enforcing crisis moments and fosters funds’ stability.
This paper tries to assess the explanatory power of these two contrasting views.
In doing so it analyzes the liquidity stance of German open-end real estate funds.
Compared to banks these ￿nancial intermediaries are far less regulated. Therefore,
they are much better suited to identify and study the described mechanisms. Even
though they are less regulated open-end real estate funds perform a liquidity trans-
formation which is very similar to those of banks: They guarantee the redemption ofshares of any volume at a price which re￿ects the discounted expected earnings and
not the market value of their assets and which adapts only staggeringly to changing
market conditions. Thus while funds’ assets - predominantly commercial real estate
- are fairly illiquid, their liabilities are very liquid.
The present paper uses a unique data set that contains balance sheet information,
performance and liquidity status on an individual fund basis from mid 1993 to mid
2007. It therefore also comprises the turn of the year 2005 to 2006 in which the
open-end fund industry was su￿ering from a severe credibility crisis which lead to
massive liquidity out￿ows. This permits us to also study to what extend the relative
importance of the two mechanisms shifts from non-crisis to crisis times. Thus we
can analyze whether poor performance or expected withdrawals of other investors
were more important for liquidity out￿ows in crisis or in non-crisis periods.
Our results show that in non-crisis periods a fund’s out￿ows are driven by both
its past performance and its liquidity ratios. Thus in tranquil periods both mecha-
nisms play a role: By withdrawing their funds in response to bad past performance
investors discipline on the one hand fund managers since managers remuneration
declines as the fund volume drops. Furthermore, a declining liquidity ratio increases
the likelihood of a future closure of the fund together with a job loss of the man-
ager. On the other hand liquidity out￿ow is particularly high at funds with a low
liquidity ratio. This suggests that investors tend to redeem their shares at funds
with a low liquidity ratio if they expect or observe a given liquidity out￿ow. In the
crisis period, however only the latter e￿ect remains signi￿cant. During the panic
investors only responded to the threat of a liquidity shortage of their funds resulting
expected withdrawals. They did not respond to past performance in that phase.
Consequently, our results suggest that a higher regulatory liquidity ratio would in-
crease crisis resilience of open-end real estate funds without undermining essential
disciplining mechanisms of the fund management. The disciplining of the manage-
ment through investors withdrawals is mainly ensured in non-crises periods and does
not work through the threat of a liquidity driven fund closure.
A further important result of the present study relates to load fees in channel-
ing liquidity out￿ows. We ￿nd that in non-crisis periods a higher load fee results
in lower liquidity out￿ows. This seems to be in line with intuition, since the loadfee has a ￿xed cost character. A fund with a lower load fee should therefore at-
tract predominantly investors with a shorter investment horizon which implies that
holding the fund’s volume constant gross out￿ows must be larger at any point in
time. However, in the crisis period we ￿nd a strong positive relation between the
the load fee and fund gross out￿ows. This could re￿ect the involvement of institu-
tional investors in German open-end real estate funds. In particular during the low
interest rate phase prior to our crisis period institutional investors used open-end
real estate funds to park liquidity at a comparably high yield. Given their relative
short investment horizon they likely invested predominately in funds that charged a
low load fee. Thus our positive relation between the load fee and the gross out￿ows
in the crisis period could be seen as an indicator for a stabilizing role of institu-
tional investors. This would be in line with recent theoretical ￿ndings which argue
that large institutional investors are less driven by expectations of the withdrawing
decisions of other investors and therefore help contain self-enforcing crisis e￿ects.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Liquidit￿tsrisiken sind, wenn nicht als Ausgangspunkt, so doch zumindest als Ver-
st￿rkungse￿ekt f￿r Finanzkrisen von zentraler Bedeutung. Auch f￿r die Ausbreitung
der Subprimekrise war das Liquidit￿tsrisiko verschiedenster Finanzintermedi￿re ent-
scheidend. Daher wurden in Folge der weltweiten Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise ver-
schiedentlich Forderungen noch einer st￿rkeren Regulierung der Liquidit￿tsrisiken
und insbesondere nach einer h￿heren regulatorischen Liquidit￿tshaltung seitens der
Banken laut.
Aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht ist es allerdings alles andere als eindeutig, ob tat-
s￿chlich eine h￿here geforderte Liquidit￿tsquote f￿r Banken sinnvoll ist. Eine der
wesentlichen Sto￿richtungen der Literatur zeigt beispielsweise, dass Bankenkrisen
vor allem durch eine schlechte Ertragslage bedingt werden. Eine Liquidit￿tstrans-
formation f￿hrt dieser Denkrichtung zu folge zwar zu einer st￿rkeren Destabilisierung
im Falle einer schlechten Rentabilit￿t, diese ist aber als Disziplinierungsinstrument
gegen￿ber dem Bankmanagement elementar. Nur die Angst, dass eine schlechte Er-
tragsentwicklung zu massivem Liquidit￿tsab￿uss, zu einer Krise der Bank und damit
letztlich u.U. zum Jobverlust f￿hrt, stellt sicher, dass das Management auch alles
tut, um eine gute Ertragsentwicklung zu garantieren. Eine h￿here Liquidit￿tsquote
unterminiert diesen E￿ekt und f￿hrt demnach vor allem zu ine￿zienteren Banken.
Eine kontr￿re Sichtweise legt dagegen nahe, dass eine h￿here Liquidit￿tsquote de-
stabilisierende und sich selbst verst￿rkende E￿ekte eind￿mmen kann. Je h￿her die
Liquidit￿tstransformation eines Finanzintermedi￿rs (je illiquider/langfristiger seine
Verm￿genswerte relativ zu seinen Verbindlichkeiten) umso gr￿￿er die Angst der In-
vestoren, dass die langfristigen Ertr￿ge ihrer Titel durch den fr￿hzeitigen Abzug
von Mitteln durch andere Investoren beeintr￿chtigt werden. Bef￿rchten Investoren
demnach einen massiven Mittelabzug, so haben sie selbst auch ein Anreiz ihre Mittel
zur￿ck zu fordern. Die Erwartungen einer (Liquidit￿ts-) Krise werden demnach sich
selbsterf￿llend. Eine h￿here Liquidit￿tsquote kann diese sich selbst verst￿rkenden
Momente einer Krise eind￿mmen und so zur Stabilisierung beitragen.
Das vorliegende Papier versucht den Erkl￿rungsgehalt dieser beiden kontr￿ren
Sichtweisen empirisch abzuw￿gen. Dabei analysiert es nicht die Liquidit￿tssituationvon Banken, sondern untersucht den Liquidit￿tsab￿uss o￿ener Immobilienfonds in
Deutschland. Im Gegensatz zu Banken sind diese Finanzintermedi￿re weit weniger
reguliert, so dass die Wirkungsweise der beschriebenen Mechanismen besser nach-
vollzogen werden kann. Dar￿ber hinaus weisen o￿ene Immobilienfonds aber eine
￿hnliche Liquidit￿tstransformation wie Banken auf: Sie garantieren die jederzeitige
R￿cknahme von Anteilscheinen in jeder H￿he zu einem Preis, der den Ertragswert
und nicht den Marktwert der Assets re￿ektiert und der sich nur verz￿gert an ver-
￿nderte Marktsituationen anpasst. D.h., die Verbindlichkeiten der Fonds sind sehr
liquide, w￿hrend die Aktivseite mit Gewerbeimmobilien weitgehend illiquide ist.
Die Untersuchung baut auf einem einzigartigen Datensatz auf, der die Bilanz,
Liquidit￿tssituation und Ertragslage jedes einzelnen deutschen o￿enen Immobilien-
fonds von Mitte 1993 bis Mitte 2007 umfasst. Er schlie￿t damit auch die Phase
einer massiven Vertrauenskrise ein, die um die Jahreswende 2005/2006 zu massiven
Liquidit￿tsab￿￿ssen aus diesem Fondsegment f￿hrte. Dies erlaubt es uns, auch zu
untersuchen, wie bedeutsam die beiden Mechanismen in Krisen- und Nichtkrisenpe-
rioden sind d.h. inwieweit schlechte Ertragsentwicklung oder erwartete Mittelabz￿ge
anderer Investoren f￿r die Mittelab￿￿sse in Krisen- relativ zu Nichtkrisenphasen ver-
antwortlich sind.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Mittelab￿uss in Nichtkrisenphasen, sowohl von
der vergangenen Ertragsentwicklung als auch von der Liquidit￿tsausstattung des je-
weiligen Fonds abh￿ngt. Demnach spielen in ruhigeren Perioden beide E￿ekte ein
Rolle: Indem sie mit Mittelabz￿gen auf eine schlechte Ertragsentwicklung reagieren,
disziplinieren Anleger einerseits das Fondmanagement: Bei einem geringen Fondvolu-
men sinkt die volumenabh￿ngige Verg￿tungskomponente. Au￿erdem k￿nnte durch
r￿ckl￿u￿ge Liquidit￿t, eine Schlie￿ung und damit ein Jobverlust wahrscheinlicher
werden. Andererseits ist aber der Mittelab￿uss bei Fonds mit geringer Liquidit￿ts-
ausstattung besonders hoch. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass Anleger bei einem Fond
mit geringer Liquidit￿tsausstattung eher ihre Anteile zur￿ckgeben, wenn sie einen
Mittelab￿uss beobachten bzw. erwarten. In der Krisenphase geht dagegen nur von
der Liquidit￿tsausstattung ein signi￿kanter E￿ekt auf den Mittelab￿uss aus. W￿h-
rend der Panik scheinen Anleger in ihrem Abzugsverhalten alleine auf eine m￿gliche
Illiquidit￿t infolge der erwarteten Ab￿￿sse reagiert zu haben und nicht nach dervergangen Ertragsentwicklung der Fonds di￿erenziert zu haben. Unsere Ergebnisse
zeigen somit, dass eine h￿here regulatorische Liquidit￿tsquote die o￿enen Immobili-
enfonds krisenfester macht, ohne essentielle Disziplinierungsmechanismen gegen￿ber
dem Fondmanagement auszuhebeln. Die Disziplinierung des Managements ￿ber das
Abzugsverhalten, scheint vor allem in Nichtkrisenperioden eine Rolle zu spielen und
hier nicht ￿ber die illiquidit￿tsbedingte Fondschlie￿ung zu wirken.
Ein weiteres interessantes Ergebnis der vorliegenden Studie bezieht sich auf den
Ausgabeaufschlag und dessen E￿ekt auf die Mittelab￿￿sse. In Nichtkrisenphasen
geht ein h￿herer Ausgabeaufschlag mit geringen Mittelab￿￿ssen einher. Da der Aus-
gabeaufschlag einen Fixkostencharakter hat, erscheint es auch logisch, dass ein Fond
mit geringerem Aufschlag insbesondere Investoren mit k￿rzerfristigem Investitions-
horizont attrahiert und somit bei gleichem Volumen zu jedem Zeitpunkt h￿here Ab-
￿￿sse hat. Interessanterweise ist aber in der Krisenphase der Zusammenhang signi-
￿kant positiv: Mit h￿herem Ausgabeaufschlag steigt der Mittelab￿uss. Dies k￿nnte
auf den Ein￿uss institutioneller Investoren zur￿ckzuf￿hren sein. Diese parkten wohl
gerade in der Niedrigzinsphase vor der Krisenperiode umfangreich Liquidit￿t in o￿e-
nen Immobilienfonds. Aufgrund ihres eher kurzfristigen Anlagehorizonts d￿rften sie
dabei eher Fonds mit geringem Ausgabeaufschlag bevorzugt haben. Insofern w￿rde
der positive Zusammenhang zwischen Ausgabeaufschlag und Mitteab￿uss auf eine
stabilisierende Rolle institutioneller Investoren hinweisen und damit j￿ngste theore-
tische Ans￿tze best￿tigen. Diese argumentieren, dass gro￿e institutionelle Investoren
weniger vom Verhalten der anderen Fondeigner und ihren Erwartung hier￿ber ge-
trieben sind und somit sich selbst verst￿rkende Krisene￿ekte eind￿mmen.Contents
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1 Introduction
The ongoing ￿nancial crisis has put the regulation of liquidity risks in the focus of
the debate about a new ￿nancial architecture. However, there are two opposing
views on the origin of ￿nancial crises which lead to two contrasting perceptions
of liquidity risks. According to the fundamental view banking crises are triggered
by low asset returns.2 Responding to bad performance by massive withdrawals
depositors exert control over the bank management. Therefore this view emphasizes
the bright side of liquidity mismatch: It is an important incentive device. 3 In
contrast, following the panic view the crises of ￿nancial institutions result from
strategic complementarities that arise from the liquidity mismatch. If the assets
of a ￿nancial institution are less liquid than their liabilities, investors prefer to
withdraw their funds prematurely or refuse to rollover short-term claims if they
expect other investors to do the same. 4 Thus liquidity risk also has a dark side in
that it generates a self-enforcing momentum to banking crisis that can also lead to
the failure of solvent banks.
Understanding the relative importance of these two views is crucial because they
have opposing implications for regulation. While a binding regulatory liquidity
holding would undermine the disciplinary role of the liquidity transformation, it
would clearly contain the self-enforcing momentum of crisis and reduce the risk of
ine￿cient liquidations of banks.
1Falko Fecht (falko.fecht@ebs.edu) and Michael Wedow (michael.wedow@bundesbank.de). We
are grateful to Itay Goldstein and Marcel Tyrell for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank
Michael Halling and participants for comments received at the FMA 2008 meeting. The paper
represents the authors’ personal opinions and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
All remaining errors are of course our own.
2Theoretical models taking this perspective are, for instance, Gorton (1985) and Allen and Gale
(1998). Empirical studies suggesting that banking crises are driven by business cycle downturns
are Gorton (1998) and Calomiris and Mason (1997).
3This argument is modeled, for instance, in Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan
(2001).
4This is the view taken in the classical work by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
1In this paper we therefore try to assess the relative importance of these two views
by studying their respective explanatory power for a crisis that hit the German open
end real estate fund industry by the end of 2005 and in the early 2006. During this
crisis the instability of one fund spread to the whole industry and lead to massive
liquidity out￿ows. Open end real estate funds are relatively unregulated in Germany
but nevertheless provide a signi￿cant liquidity transformation. Thus compared to
studies that focus on the relatively regulated banking sector this crisis episode in
Germany is much better suited to tell apart the two opposing views. 5 Our data
set comprises detailed balance sheet information for each individual German fund,
its returns, the fees charged, and its liquidity out￿ow before, during, and after the
crisis.
Our results show that investors’ withdrawal decisions are driven by past returns
before and to some extent also directly after the crisis. However, past performance
does not have any explanatory power for the liquidity out￿ows during the crisis.
This suggests that during the crisis investors did not di￿erentiate between well and
badly managed funds. Investors did not use their withdrawal decision to exert
control over the fund management. On the contrary, the sizeable explanatory power
of funds’ liquidity for their out￿ows in particular during the crisis suggests that
investors more or less only responded in the crisis to strategic complementarities.
Thus while in more tranquil periods withdrawals might ful￿ll their disciplinary role
and complementarities are of minor importance, during the crisis the self-enforcing
elements put forward by the panic view seem to be prevailing. This suggests that
there are signi￿cant non-linearities involved in the role of complementarities and
that studies that try to assess the importance of complementarities during tranquil
times might be misleading.6
This view is also supported by our results on the impact of the regional scope of
the funds. The troubled fund that triggered the crisis was only invested in German
real estate. Furthermore, the ailing German economy depressed German real estate
investment returns by that time. However, our results indicate that during the crisis
5For a recent study that tries to assess the disciplinary role of demand deposits in banking see
Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001)
6See Chen et al. (2007) for a recent study that assesses the role of complementarities in the
U.S. mutual fund market during normal times.
2out￿ows of funds that were only invested in Germany did not signi￿cantly vary from
out￿ows at internationally invested funds based in Germany. This suggests that
the investors’ run was not simply a response to revised expectations about future
returns.7
A further interesting result concerns the role of load fees. Since load fees have
￿xed cost character one would expect that investors are willing to pay higher load
fee the longer their investment horizon. For the pre-crisis period as well as for the
post-crisis period we ￿nd that indeed gross out￿ows are smaller the larger the load
fee suggesting that indeed the average investment horizon of investors is larger the
larger the load fee. However, during the crisis period we ￿nd a strong positive e￿ect
of the load fee on out￿ows. Thus larger load fees and longer average investment
horizons do not keep investors from running. Quite the contrary, investors with
shorter investment horizons seem to have a stabilizing e￿ect. This might be related
to the role of large investors in panics and the fact that institutional investors used
on a large scale open end real estate funds to park liquidity. As shown in recent the-
oretical work by Corsetti et al. (2001) and Bannier (2005) large investors internalize
part of the complementarities and therefore respond less to their expectations about
the behavior of other investors. Thus instead of herding they react more on fun-
damentals and thereby limit the destabilizing e￿ect of strategic complementarities.
Consequently, if institutional investors had relatively short investment horizons (be-
cause they only wanted to park liquidity) they likely preferred those funds with low
load fees. This in turn stabilized those funds’ out￿ows during the panic. In order to
￿nd more evidence for this reasoning, we also use some low frequency data on the
investor structure of the individual real estate funds. However, here we do not ￿nd
any systematic in￿uence of the fraction of fund shares held by retail investors and
out￿ows.
7This also means that we do not ￿nd evidence for the informational contagion put forward by
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Chen (1999).
32 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. Most importantly, as already
discussed in the introduction our paper contributes to the debate about the origins
of ￿nancial crises. It tries to shed some light on the explanatory power of the two
opposing views: the fundamental view and the panic view on ￿nancial crisis as
contrasted, for instance, in Allen and Gale (2007).
The main theoretical contribution modeling the fundamental view is Allen and
Gale (1998) who argue that bank runs are a result of weakened banks’ return on
assets in a business cycle downturn. This view is supported by the empirical study
of Gorton (1998) who ￿nds that historically bank runs are predictable using business
cycle data. Calomiris and Mason (1997) ￿nd empirical support that individual bank
failures were strongly correlated with bad aggregate and individual fundamentals
during the great depression. Our paper contrasts with their results since we do not
￿nd any evidence that fundamentals help explain the massive withdrawals of funds
in the crisis. Neither past performance nor geographical investment scope seems
to have an in￿uence on investors’ withdrawal decision. From that perspective our
paper also tests the theoretical arguments put forward by Chari and Jagannathan
(1988) and Chen (1999) who argue that a run results if investors update their return
expectations of their bank when observing another bank with a similar portfolio
failing. In the case of the German open end real estate funds the fund that initially
failed was only invested in Germany. However, investors ran also on those funds
that were globally or Europe wide invested.
These results are also related to Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and
Rajan (2001). They argue that the liquidity risk generated by the maturity trans-
formation serves as a disciplinary device. The threat of a run is necessary to ensure
that managers of ￿nancial institutions behave and contribute to a high return. But
even though managers might behave in equilibrium, bad luck might lead to low
returns which trigger a run. Given that we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant in￿uence
of fundamental factors on the cross-sectional distribution of liquidity out￿ows, our
results do not con￿rm the view that panics are a measure to exert control. In-
vestors in German open end real estate funds did not di￿erentiate between funds
4according to their past performance during the crisis. However, in more tranquil
periods investors respond signi￿cantly to past performance. Thus to that end our
paper con￿rms the ￿ndings of a vast literature that indicates that open-end mutual
fund investors use past performance as a screening and monitoring device for fund
managers. Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), for example,
￿nd evidence that mutual fund ￿ows are positively related to past performance. At
the same time, though, Edelen (1999) ￿nds evidence that unexpected ￿ows force
fund managers into detrimental liquidity trades and impair funds’ performance. 8
The panic view which goes back to the path breaking work by Bryant (1980) and
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) emphasizes that strategic complementarities between
the withdrawal decision of depositors arises because the withdrawal of other deposi-
tors reduces the expected repayment that a single depositor can realize if he refrains
from withdrawing. These complementarities in depositors’ strategies can generate
a coordination failure and lead to a bank run. The problem with this multiple
equilibria view is that the crises are completely unrelated to economic fundamen-
tals. The literature on global games following Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
and Morris and Shin (1998) shows that the multiplicity of equilibria does not oc-
cur when investors have slightly heterogenous beliefs about economic fundamentals
while strategic complementarities still prevail. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) apply
this approach to depository institutions and ￿nd that due to the strategic comple-
mentarities among depositors marginal changes in fundamentals can lead to a panic
and to a sudden increase in withdrawals. Using the liquidity ratio and the interac-
tion between the liquidity ratio and the past performance as explanatory variables
for the out￿ows permits us to study the role that these strategic complementarities
played in the crisis. If a fund has a high liquidity ratio even large redemptions by
investors (triggered by the crisis of other funds or by deteriorating past performance)
do not necessarily have a negative e￿ect on the future redemption rate. From this
perspective our paper is also related to the empirical work by Chen et al. (2007).
Using US mutual funds data they show that indeed the liquidity out￿ows are more
sensitive to bad performance in funds that hold less liquid assets. In contrast to our
8The results by Jank and Wedow (2008) also con￿rm that performance drives ￿ows into funds
but that enhancing performance may also make funds more vulnerable when market liquidity dries
up.
5paper, the period they study is a relatively tranquil period without any substantial
turmoil in asset markets. But by their very nature strategic complementarities are
more important in periods of crises such as the one considered in our paper. And
our results show indeed that studying complementarities during tranquil periods
does not provide a full picture of their importance. While complementarities seem
to amplify withdrawals in response to bad performance in non-crises periods, the
purely self-enforcing mechanisms are much more important during crises.
One way to contain the liquidity risk and its adverse e￿ect on funds’ performance
is to charge a high load fee and thereby attract rather long-term oriented investors.
This argument has been formally modeled, for instance, by Nanda et al. (2000).
Similar to our results Chordia (1996) ￿nds that indeed load fees dissuade investors
with large liquidity risks from short-term investment and redemption. However, an
issue that has not been addressed in the literature so far is, to what extent these
mechanisms still work during panics, i.e. whether investors still care about the
paid load fee during panics or whether investors with di￿erent investment horizon
respond di￿erently if they anticipate large scale redemptions of other investors with
its negative e￿ect on performance.
The application of global games to ￿nancial crisis has also shown that com-
plementarities and the resulting ampli￿cation of crises can be mitigated by large
investors. Given their larger average size institutional investors know that it is
likely that their decision is pivotal for the default of the ￿nancial institution. Thus
they tend to internalize the implication of their own decision, do not rely too much
on their expectations about the decision of others and therefore contribute to more
resilient ￿nancial institutions. This was ￿rst pointed out by Corsetti et al. (2001)
in the context of currency crises. 9 Chen et al. (2007) present a formal model of this
argument for mutual funds and test it for US open end mutual funds. They ￿nd
that funds primarily held by institutional investors su￿er less from e￿ects induced
by complementarities than mutual funds. While our direct low frequency measure
of the share of institutional investors does not indicate any signi￿cant e￿ect on out-
￿ows during the crisis, the impact of the load fee might actually capture this e￿ect.
Related is also the study of Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and James and Karceski
9See also Bannier (2005) for the role of informational advantages of institutional investors in
this reasoning.
6(2006) who show that the involvement of institutional investors seems to contribute
to a better screening and monitoring of mutual funds. Funds with a larger share
held by institutional investors tend to perform better.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents a short
institutional description of the German open end real estate fund industry and gives
some background information on the crisis. In section 4 we describe our data set
and in section 5 our estimation approach. Section 6 gives the results and section 7
draws some conclusions.
3 Background on open end real estate funds in Ger-
many and the 2005/2006 crisis
Open-end real estate funds are the most important retail investment vehicle for real
estate in Germany.10 In 2007 these funds managed in total about 85 bn Euro which
amounted to roughly 10% of German investment funds’ assets.
Compared with other retail ￿nancial institutions open-end real estate funds are
relatively unregulated.11 Open-end real estate funds are obliged to hold between
5% and 49% of their assets in liquid reserves, i.e. cash and securities. When liquid
reserves drop below 5% the management of the fund has the option to suspend
redemption. During this period the fund has to obtain additional resources by
liquidating some assets or by increasing his debt ratio. To do so the fund can
suspend redemption up to two years. However, up to 2005 no fund ever had to
resort to this measure. The book value of the real estate held by funds is assessed
by external experts once a year based on the expected future return on these assets.
To avoid large jumps in the book value a 12th of the real estate is evaluated every
month. Together with liquid reserves these book values are the basis for the quoted
redemption price.
While in most other countries open-end real estate funds disappeared, often as a
10This section gives only a brief overview of the institutional background and of the crisis. For
a more detailed description see Bannier et al. (2008).
11See Maurer et al. (2004) for a more detailed account of role, legal environment and ￿nancial
characteristics of open-end real estate funds.
7consequence of severe crises, they are still quite successful in Germany. Between 1993
and 2003 capital invested in these fund more than quintupled, whereby particularly
in the aftermath of the stock market downturn in 2001 large amounts of capital
￿ew into open-end real estate funds (see Figure 1). However, starting in 2004 fund
volumes stagnated. At the same time the anyway rather low but very stable returns
of these funds reached a historical low and continued to decline. Withdrawal of funds
at individual open-end real estate funds started and triggered a liquidity shortage,
for instance, at the fund managed by the investment company owned by DekaBank,
HypoVereinsbank, and Commerzbank. In all cases, however, the banks stepped in
and provided liquidity often by buying up shares or real estate from their respective
funds.
Figure 1: Open Real-Estate Funds: Volume in bill. of Euro (rhs) and y-o-y Return
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On December 11, 2005, Deutsche Bank announced that an unscheduled reevalua-
tion of its biggest ($7:2 billion) real estate fund, Grundbesitz Invest, was unavoidable
8and would very likely lead to a devaluation of the redemption price. This lead to a
dramatic withdrawal of funds not only from Grundbesitz Invest but also from most
other German open-end real estate funds. At Grundbesitz Invest this run absorbed
most of the fund’s liquidity. Since Deutsche Bank refused to provide additional
liquidity, redemption had to be suspended on 13th of December, 2005. Yet the
dramatic liquidity out￿ow continued at other funds (see ￿gure 2).
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On January, 17th and 19th two additional funds managed by investment com-
pany KanAm had to be closed after a rating agency set their recommendation on
sell.12 Given the already alarmed investors the sell recommendation accelerated
the liquidity out￿ow leading ultimately to the closure of the two funds and a re-
newed upsurge of out￿ows in other funds (see in particular ￿gure 3). The following
12The decision of the rating agency was primarily based on a link of the investment company
with a partner in the US which the rating agency argued would trigger a run on the fund and thus
the suspension of convertibility.
9months saw a decline in aggregate out￿ows which were only shortly interrupted by
the reopening of the 3 previously closed funds. 13 Net ￿ows again turned positive by
around June 2006 and have since largely remained on this shore.
Figure 3: Open Real-Estate Funds: Daily Flows in mill. of Euro, 15th of Dec.2005
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4 The Data
The data used in the analysis comes from three di￿erent data bases of the Bundes-
bank which each o￿er a di￿erent observation frequency. First, our data set contains
daily data on the the liquidity status of each individual open-end real estate fund in
Germany. This daily data was collected as a consequence of the ongoing di￿culties
of the German open-end real estate funds at the end of 2005. The data comprise
13DB Grundbesitz Invest restarted redemption of shares on the 3rd of March, KanAm Grund-
invest on the 31th of March and KanAm US-Grundinvest on the 13th of April. Further peaks in
Figure 3 are due to sales of shares by banks which supported funds.
10384 trading days from the 15th of December 2005 until the 27th of June 2007. The
information therein includes in- and out￿ows as well as the liquidity position of 33
up to 39 funds.14 The number of reporting funds varies given that three funds were
temporarily closed down during the crisis and because ￿ve additional funds started
reporting which were issued in the second half of 2006.
Second, the Bundesbank collects monthly data on a range of balance sheet items
for real estate funds covering also information on the Load Fee, Debt, Liquidity and
Size of each fund.15 We use this data in our analysis of the pre-crisis period. The
data also contains a 12-month rolling Return for each fund adjusted for dividends
and net of management fee. This relatively large rolling window appears warranted
given the large persistence of returns. 16
Third, data on the involvement of households measured by the percentage of
total outstanding shares held by households on a quarterly basis are added. This
data is covered by the variable Private.
Finally, we add variables containing information on the geographic focus and age
in years for each fund. The geographic focus is given by a dummy variable equal to
1 if a fund’s majority of investments is located in Germany. A further dummy ( Non-
Retail) was added for funds that are not truly mutual funds. A number of mutual
funds have high minimum investment requirements or are only accessible for certain
types of institutional investors. We therefore include a dummy for Non-Retail Fund
equal to one if a fund stipulates such requirements which limit the accessibility by
retail investors.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for key variables and Table 5 the correlation
matrix.
14The out￿ow of funds is given by the value of actual share redemptions and excludes dividend
payments. This is particulary important for open real estate funds since that they are obliged by
law to pay out 90 % of any capital gains.
15The load fee is calculated on the basis of the di￿erence between issue and redemption price
and is expressed as a ratio over the redemption price. In the empirical analysis, we use the load
fee lagged by one month.
16Calculation is based on the Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management e.V (BVI).
11Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Quarterly Data: 2005Q4 to 2007Q1
Private Investors 235 0.45 0.35 0.00 0.96
Monthly Data: May 1993 to June 2008
Out￿ow Ratio 3365 1.4% 3.1% 0.0% 84.3%
12-month Return 3365 4.7% 1.9% -0.6% 16.6%
Liquidity Ratio 3365 32.3% 14.7% 2.2% 100.0%
Debt Ratio 3365 12.8% 12.5% 0.0% 89.6%
Load Fee 3365 4.9% 1.0% 0.0% 12.7%
Age 3365 17.6 13.2 1.0 45.0
Geo.Focus 3365 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Non-Retail Funds 3365 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Daily Data: 15th of Dec. 2005 to 27th of June 2007
Out￿ow Ratio 7970 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 22.4%
Liquidity Ratio 7937 24.4% 12.9% 0.0% 100.0%
Net￿ow Ratio 7947 0.0% 0.6% -22.2% 12.4%
Private Investors is the share of private investors in a fund. Out￿ow (Net￿ow) ratio is the absolute out￿ow
(net￿ow) over the volume of the fund. The 12-month return is a 12-month rolling return for any given
month. The liquidity ratio is given by the ratio of liquid assets over the volume of the fund. The debt ratio
is given by total debt over the volume of the fund. The load fee is the di￿erence between issue and
redemption price as a ratio of the redemption price. Age is given in years since establishment of the fund.
Geo. Focus is a dummy equal to one if a fund’s assets are predominantly located in Germany. Non-retail
fund is a dummy equal to one if a fund has investor restrictions in place.
5 Regression Analysis
Since we are interested in explaining the relative liquidity shock of the open-end
real estate funds we use as endogenous variable the Euro value of out￿ow of each
fund divided by its size, i.e. its balance sheet total in Euro. We also normalize the
liquidity and the debt of each fund by dividing it by the size of the respective fund
to get the liquidity and debt ratio. Return is given by the rolling 12-month return
and measured in per cent. The load fee is calculated as the di￿erence between the
issue and redemption price and is given as ratio over the redemption price. In order
to avoid any bias as result of endogeneity we use lagged values for all our right hand
side variables.
We estimate the gross out￿ows separately for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
crisis period. We do so for two reasons: Firstly, studying the di￿erent periods
separately allows us to see whether investors’ motives for withdrawing their funds
varies between crises and non-crises times. In particular this permits us to study
whether complementarities become more severe in crises periods. Secondly, the crisis
12lasted only ￿ve months. Thus using monthly data does not allow us to develop a
detailed picture of the crisis period. Using the daily data we are able to give a much
more clear cut analysis of the crisis. However, using data at di￿erent frequencies
for the di￿erent periods apparently limits the comparability of the results across
periods.
Consequently, for the pre-crisis period for which we dispose only of monthly data











We try to explain the relative out￿ow of fund i in month m by fund i’s past
return, liquidity ratio, and load fee etc. in that respective month.
For the crisis and post-crisis period we have daily data available. For those two











where Out￿ow and Liquidity is given for each fund i on day t. Return, Debt
and Load Fee are also for these periods given at a monthly frequency.  represents
the error term, where we assume i;t  iid(0, 2
), is independent. We focus on
out￿ows instead of net ￿ows for three reasons. First, from the theoretical perspective
complementarities are relevant for out￿ows only. Secondly, as Figure 2 shows the
behavior of in- and out￿ows di￿er widely. Third and related there is the potential
that banks provided support to open-end real estate funds thus leading to a bias in
actual ￿ows.
We primarily rely on the ￿xed e￿ects estimator since this estimator will be con-
sistent in the presence of any correlation between the explanatory variables and the
￿xed e￿ect but also show the results for the random e￿ects estimator. Irrespective
of the estimator the direction of the e￿ects remain largely unchanged.
136 Results
Our ￿rst set of estimations covers the pre-crisis period from April 1994 to November
2005 using the available monthly data. The estimation results are reported in table
2. Each column reports the results for an estimation of funds’ out￿ow and gives the
coe￿cients of the explanatory variable in the respective row. The absolute value of
the respective z-statistics are reported in brackets below each coe￿cient.
Most importantly is the negative e￿ect of past returns on gross out￿ows. Thus
fundamentals matter for withdrawal decisions. Withdrawals at a speci￿c fund are
the higher the worse the past performance of that respective fund was. This also
con￿rms our hypothesis that investors’ withdrawal decisions serves as a disciplining
device. If fund managers know that a low performance induces larger out￿ows
they have stronger incentives to ensure a high return because their remuneration is
typically related to the volume of funds under management. Furthermore, due to the
liquidity transformation higher liquidity out￿ows depress future returns since fund
managers might be forced into detrimental ￿re sales or to raise debt at unfavorable
conditions.17 So also future performance related remuneration will be reduced by
the withdrawals. Moreover, lower future returns increase future out￿ow and the
anticipation of this vicious circle can lead to a run on the fund and its closure. Also
this threat might have a disciplining e￿ect on fund managers. 18
The second evident e￿ect that we ￿nd is that funds that had a higher previous
liquidity ratio experience lower out￿ows. Since we focus here on gross out￿ow,
i.e. withdrawals only, our result indicates that withdrawals are larger if a fund
holds fewer liquidity. This suggest that there are complementarities at play: At a
fund that holds less liquidity a withdrawal of some investors will induce more other
investors to withdraw, too, because the expected negative e￿ects of the withdrawal
on future performance is larger. A higher liquidity ratio enables a fund to redeem
a larger number of shares without liquidation costs. 19 However, the sensitivity of
out￿ows to lower returns is reduced by a higher liquidity ratio (see column 8 in table
17See Edelen (1999) who provides direct evidence of this e￿ect for open end mutual investment
funds in the U.S.
18Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) ￿nd evidence for this e￿ect in the Latin American bank-
ing sector.
19It might be interesting to note that a potential endogenous e￿ect would run in opposite direc-
tion: Funds that anticipate higher liquidity out￿ows would hold higher liquidity ratios.
142). Thus at funds with a high liquidity ratio the sensitivity of out￿ows to return
shocks was smaller. In line with the argument of the global games literature the
response to bad fundamentals was less ampli￿ed by strategic complementarities at
funds that had a high liquidity ratio. 20
However, we do not ￿nd evidence for a dampening e￿ect of institutional in-
vestors on out￿ows in the pre-crisis period. The return sensitivity of open end real
estate funds that are classi￿ed as non-retail fund is not signi￿cantly lower than the
sensitivity of retail funds (see column 7 in table 2).
With respect to the load fee our hypothesis is that a larger load fee deters
short-term investors. Thus the average holding period of investors should increase.
Consequently, for a fund of given size with a larger load fee the gross out￿ows should
be lower. The estimated coe￿cients have in all cases the expected size. However,
they are generally not signi￿cant.
We also report the results of the baseline regression using the random e￿ects
model in column 6 of table 2. Compared with the coe￿cients of the ￿xed e￿ects
model in column 5 the results remain stable. The Hausman test indicates for the
pre-crisis period no signi￿cant di￿erence between the estimates of the two models
which suggests to use the random e￿ects results for e￿ciency reasons.
Our second set of estimations makes use of the daily data for the crisis period
between mid of December 2005 and end of May 2006. The results are reported in
table 3. While the coe￿cient of previous returns has the expected sign, it is generally
not signi￿cant for this period. During the crisis period investors seem to have paid
less attention to funds’ past performance when taking their withdrawal decisions.
However, this might also re￿ect the fact that the past return is at monthly frequency
while the liquidity out￿ow is for this period on a daily basis.
The liquidity ratio of the fund is available in the same frequency as the with-
drawals. In contrast to past returns, the liquidity status has indeed a signi￿cant
and relatively strong e￿ect on the gross liquidity out￿ow. Thus during the crisis
investors withdrew their funds particularly from those funds that ran a low liquidity
ratio. This suggests that investors were driven by the concern over a liquidity crisis
20See, for instance, Chen et al. (2007) who argue along that line.
15of funds due to excessive withdrawals. At funds with higher liquidity ratios this con-
cern were smaller and withdrawals therefore lower. The sensitivity of out￿ow to the
liquidity ratio seems to have been much higher during the crisis than before indicat-
ing that indeed strategic complementarities became much more a worry in the wake
of the panic. However, there is also a di￿erent interpretation of our results. The
crisis was triggered by the announcement of Deutsche Bank that real estate held
by its fund had to be devaluated. Consequently, devaluation expectations might
have been lower at funds that held a relatively high liquidity ratio. This might also
explain why out￿ows at those funds were smaller.
In contrast to the pre-crisis period, for the crisis period complementarities did not
amplify the liquidity drain in response to bad performance. Since past performance
does apparently not explain out￿ows during the crisis, it is not surprising that this
e￿ect was also not ampli￿ed by complementarities. However, the signi￿cant negative
coe￿cient of the interaction term of the liquidity ratio and past performance is
puzzling (see column 8 of table 3). According to this result funds with a high
liquidity ratio should have a higher sensitivity of out￿ows to past return which is at
odds with the results from the global games literature.
We also included a dummy variable for the geographical focus of the fund in our
estimations. In 2005/2006 real estate investment experienced very low returns only
in Germany and not on a European or global level. Therefore, the devaluation and
closure of Deutsche Bank’s fund only revealed information about the performance
of German real estate investment. Consequently, if indeed investors updated their
beliefs about the future returns of real estate funds based on the closure decision of
Deutsche Bank they would have run only on domestically invested funds. However,
our estimations indicate that investors did not di￿erentiate between funds according
to their investment scope. This further strengthens the view that it was not the more
severe downgrade of return expectations why investors withdrew particularly from
funds with a low liquidity ratio but rather the fear from more severe return e￿ects
of excessive withdrawal of other investors. 21
21Notice that one could also argue that a high liquidity ratio was an indication of high future
performance in the presence of very weak real estate returns. While this might have been true for
some funds that were solely invested in Germany this argument does not hold for Germany based
funds that were globally invested.
16The debt ratio can be viewed as a second measure for a fund’s liquidity. There
is a regulatory upper limit imposed on the debt ratio of open-end real estate funds
of 50 % that limits their ability to obtain liquidity when needed. Consequently,
a higher debt ratio should have a positive e￿ect on out￿ows. However, one may
think of a negative e￿ect when re￿nancing of real estate with debt is relatively
cheaper. In that case a high debt ratio signals higher future returns. These two
counterbalancing e￿ects might explain why we do not ￿nd a signi￿cant e￿ect of the
debt ratio on out￿ows during the crisis.
Interestingly, a further robust result of our estimations indicates that the out￿ow
was larger at funds that charges a higher load fee. A larger upfront fee, which also
means a larger fee to reinvest in a fund, does not contain investors incentives to
withdraw during a run. The tilt towards longer-term investors that could supposedly
by achieved by charging a higher load fee does not limit investors tendency to panic.
On the contrary, funds with a higher load fee might have attracted particularly
small long-term oriented retail investors while institutional investors that are more
concerned with asset liquidity were deterred from buying shares. Following the
￿ndings of the global games literature complementarities are most severe among
small retail investors, while large institutional investors contain them. This might
explain why the load fee did not reduce the liquidity out￿ow but rather spurred the
withdrawals during the crisis.22
To explore this argument further we use quarterly data on the investor structure
of the individual funds in column 9 of table 3. The ratio of shares held by of private
investors permits us to study whether the coordination problem and ultimately
complementarities are indeed more severe if small retail investors account for a
larger fraction of investors. In addition, interacting the fraction of shares held by
private investors with the return also allows us to study whether the investors’
response to lower past performance is more ampli￿ed by strategic complementarities
given a larger fraction of small retail investors. However, neither the fraction of
private investors nor its interaction with past performance has a signi￿cant e￿ect on
out￿ows according to our estimates (see column 9 and 10 in table 3). Similarly the
22The random e￿ects coe￿cients are reported in column 6. The Hausman test is signi￿cant
which indicates that the coe￿cients are inconsistent in the random e￿ects model. We thus only
refer to the results of ￿xed e￿ect model.
17interaction of the dummy variable for non-retail funds with the past performance
has no signi￿cant impact on withdrawal decision. Thus with this lower frequency
data we cannot con￿rm the view that institutional investors stabilized the liquidity
out￿ow.
In the third set of estimations we study the post-crisis period using the data on
the daily liquidity out￿ows starting on the 1st of June 2006 and show the results
in table 4. For this period we ￿nd only few robustly signi￿cant determinants of the
redemption of shares. The past return as well as the liquidity ratio have puzzlingly in
few estimates a positive e￿ect on out￿ows. However, mostly they are insigni￿cant.
Interestingly, when an interaction term between the liquidity ratio and the past
performance is included (see column 8) both past performance and the liquidity
ratio have the expected signi￿cant negative sign. Furthermore, in this speci￿cation
we ￿nd that a higher liquidity ratio dampens the e￿ect of past performance on
out￿ows which is again in line with the predictions of the global games literature.
Further robustly signi￿cant results for this sub-period are, ￿rst, a negative e￿ect
of the load fee on out￿ows which is again in line with the view that a high load fee
increases the expected investment horizon and therefore reduces the average with-
drawals. Second, we ￿nd a robust negative e￿ect of the debt ratio on the out￿ows.
Thus withdrawals at funds with a relatively high debt ratio were lower. This might
re￿ect the already mentioned e￿ect that in a low interest rate environment a high
leverage might bring about high expected returns.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the out￿ows of funds from German open-end real estate
funds before, during and after a crisis period in 2005 and 2006. We disentangle the
e￿ects that contributed to these massive withdrawals. We ￿nd that in contrast to
the pre-crisis period during the panic fundamentals did not matter: funds’ past per-
formance had no signi￿cant impact on investors withdrawal decision. Furthermore,
the sensitivity of out￿ows to past performance was only more severe at funds with a
low liquidity ratio in the pre-crisis period. But we ￿nd that during the crisis strate-
gic complementarities became more important for out￿ows. Particularly during the
18panic (but also to a lesser extent in the pre-crisis period) funds with a low liquidity
ratio experienced more dramatic out￿ows. This suggest that a main driving force of
the crisis were investors worries about massive withdrawals of other investors and its
depressing e￿ect on future returns. Thus while our results indicate that the liquidity
transformation of open-end funds might serve during normal times as a disciplining
device since investors respond to bad performance, during a crisis fundamentals do
not play a role and the liquidity risk only generates strategic complementarities and
the self-enforcing mechanisms leading to liquidity crisis. Thus a higher regulatory
liquidity ratio would increase crisis resilience of open-end real estate funds with-
out undermining essential disciplining mechanisms of the fund management. The
disciplining of the management through investors withdrawals is mainly ensured in
non-crises periods and does not work through the threat of a funds closure due to a
liquidity shortage.
A load fee also seems to have a positive e￿ect on the average holding period
of investors in normal times. It thereby contains withdrawals in non-crises peri-
ods. However, we do not ￿nd evidence that investors with longer-term investment
horizons have a lower tendency to panic during a crisis. On the contrary, the load
fee had a signi￿cant positive e￿ect on withdrawals during the crisis. Since particu-
larly institutional investors used the funds to park liquidity, they might have been
the share holders with the shortest investment horizon. Thus at funds with a high
load fee only a low fraction of shares were held by institutional investors. Large
institutional investors are supposed to have a stabilizing role since they contain the
ampli￿cation through strategic complementarities. Consequently, those funds that
had a higher load fee and thus fewer institutional investors might therefore have
experienced more severe out￿ows. Hence, our ￿ndings support the view that the
involvement of institutional investors did not necessarily contribute to the severity
of the crisis.
A major policy implications of our results is that the suspension of convertibility
that is required if the liquidity ratio drops below 5% is indeed bene￿cial. Obviously,
a mandatory minimum liquidity ratio might depress funds’ returns. However, the
average asset returns of most open end real estate funds were not substantially above
money market rates suggesting that overall fund returns were not impaired by the
19regulatory liquidity holding. Furthermore, as discussed in the paper mandatory
liquidity holdings could in principle undermine the disciplinary role of the liquidity
transformation as a run never leads to a liquidation of the fund. However, according
to our ￿ndings investors do not respond to fundamentals during panics. They do
not di￿erentiate between funds that performed well and those that underperform.
Thus the liquidity transformation does not serve as a disciplinary device since it does
not amplify incentives to withdraw from ailing funds. Consequently, a mandatory
liquidity holding cannot undermine this disciplinary e￿ect.
We ￿nd complementarities that amplify incentives to withdraw as response to
bad performance only for non-crises period, i.e. periods when funds were not a￿ected
by liquidity shortages. Those complementarities might have a disciplinary e￿ect but
they are not constraint by a minimum liquidity requirement.
A suspension of convertibility triggered by a shortfall of the liquidity ratio below
some threshold contains, however, the complementarities that constitute to a pure
panic. The strong response of withdrawals to actual liquidity holdings indicates that
investors were particularly worried about funds’ illiquidity and resulting detrimen-
tal ￿re sales during the crisis. This e￿ect should be in principle eliminated by a
suspension of convertibility. However, a low threshold level for the liquidity ratio
dilutes the stabilizing impact of a suspension of convertibility. Only at a relatively
high threshold investors no longer need to worry that excessive withdrawals force a
fund into detrimental ￿re sales of assets. Thus the fact that complementarities still
play a prominent role at a mandatory liquidity ratio of 5% suggests that it might
be bene￿cial to increases that threshold.
On a more general note, a higher mandatory liquidity ratio should not only
stabilize liquidity out￿ows it should also stabilize asset price developments. On
the one hand, if funds are no longer forced into detrimental ￿re sales during crises
devaluations of commercial real estate should be less pronounced. On the other
hand, if funds are forced to hold on to more liquidity when attracting new funds
the pace at which they can invest in new real estate is slower and the risk of the
emergence of potential real estate bubbles is limited.
20References
Allen, F. and D. Gale (1998). Optimal ￿nancial crises. Journal of Finance 53,
1245￿1284.
Allen, F. and D. Gale (2007). Understanding Financial Crises. Oxford University
Press.
Bannier, C., F. Fecht, and M. Tyrell (2008). Open-End Real Estate Funds in Ger-
many - Genesis and Crisis . Kredit und Kapital 1.
Bannier, C. E. (2005). Big elephants in small ponds: Do large traders make ￿nancial
markets more aggressive? Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1517￿1531.
Bryant, J. (1980). A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance. Journal
of Banking and Finance 4, 335￿344.
Calomiris, C. and C. Kahn (1991). The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements. American Economic Review 81 (3), 497￿513.
Calomiris, C. and J. Mason (1997). Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great
Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic. American Economic Re-
view 87(5), 863￿883.
Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993). Global games and equilibrium selection.
Econometrica 61, 989￿1018.
Chari, V. and R. Jagannathan (1988). Banking Panics, Information, and Rational
Expectations Equilibrium. Journal of Finance 43, 749￿760.
Chen, Q., I. Goldstein, and W. Jiang (2007). Payo￿ complementarities and ￿nancial
fragility: Evidence from mututal fund out￿ows.
Chen, Y. (1999). Banking panics: The role of the ￿rst-come, ￿rst-served rule and
informational externalities. Journal of Political Economy 107 (5), pp. 946￿968.
Chordia, T. (1996). The Structure of mutual fund charges. Journal of Financial
Economics 41, 3￿39.
21Corsetti, G., A. Dasgupta, S. Morris, and H. S. Shin (2001). Does one Soros Make a
Di￿erence? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review
of Economic Studies 71 (1), 87￿114.
Del Guercio, D. and P. Tkac (2002). The determinants of the ￿ow of funds on
managed portfolios: Mutual funds vs. pension funds. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 37, 523￿557.
Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity.
Journal of Political Economy 91, 401￿419.
Diamond, D. and R. Rajan (2001). Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and ￿nancial
fragility: A theory of banking. Journal of Political Economy 109 , 287￿327.
Edelen, R. M. (1999). Investor ￿ows and the assessed performance of open-end
mutual funds. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 439￿466.
Goldstein, I. and A. Pauzner (2005). Demand-deposit contracts and the probability
of bank runs. Journal of Finance 60 (3), 1293￿1328.
Gorton, G. (1985). Bank suspension of convertibility. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 15, 177￿193.
Gorton, G. (1998). Panking panics and business cycles. Oxford Economic Papers 40,
751￿781.
Gruber, M. J. (1996). Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual
Funds. The Journal of Finance 51 (3), 783￿810.
Ippolito, R. A. (1992). Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence
from the Mutual Fund Industry. Journal of Law and Economics 35 (1), 45￿70.
James, C. and J. Karceski (2006). Investor monitoring and di￿erences in mutual
fund performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 30 , 2787￿2808.
Jank, S. and M. Wedow (2008). Sturm und Drang in Money Market Funds: When
Money Market Funds Cease to be Narrow. Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Pa-
per 20.
22Martinez Peria, M. S. and S. Schmukler (2001). Do Depositors Punish Banks for
Bank Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises. Jour-
nal of Finance 66, 1029￿1051.
Maurer, R., R. Frank, and R. Rogalla (2004). Return and risk of German open-end
real estate funds. Journal of Property Research 21 (3), 209￿233.
Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1998). Unique equilbrium in a model of self-ful￿lling
currency attacks. American Economic Review 88, 587￿597.
Nanda, V., M. Narayanan, and V. A. Warther (2000). Liquidity, investment ability,
and mutual fund structure. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 417￿443.
Sirri, E. R. and P. Tufano (1998). Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows. The







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The following Discussion Papers have been published since 2008: 
Series 1: Economic Studies 
 
 01  2008  Can capacity constraints explain 
      asymmetries of the business cycle?  Malte Knüppel 
 
 02  2008  Communication, decision-making and the 
      optimal degree of transparency of monetary 
     policy  committees  Anke  Weber 
 
 03  2008  The impact of thin-capitalization rules on  Buettner, Overesch 
      multinationals’ financing and investment decisions Schreiber, Wamser 
 
 04  2008  Comparing the DSGE model with the factor model:  
      an out-of-sample forecasting experiment  Mu-Chun Wang 
 
 05  2008  Financial markets and the current account –  Sabine Herrmann 
      emerging Europe versus emerging Asia  Adalbert Winkler 
 
 06  2008  The German sub-national government bond  Alexander Schulz 
      market: evolution, yields and liquidity  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 07  2008  Integration of financial markets and national  Mathias Hoffmann 
      price levels: the role of exchange rate volatility  Peter Tillmann 
 
 08  2008  Business cycle evidence on firm entry  Vivien Lewis 
 
 09  2008  Panel estimation of state dependent adjustment 
      when the target is unobserved  Ulf von Kalckreuth 
 
 10  2008  Nonlinear oil price dynamics –  Stefan Reitz 
      a tale of heterogeneous speculators?  Ulf Slopek 
 
 11  2008  Financing constraints, firm level adjustment 






 12  2008  Sovereign bond market integration:  Alexander Schulz 
      the euro, trading platforms and globalization  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 13  2008  Great moderation at the firm level?  Claudia M. Buch 
      Unconditional versus conditional output  Jörg Döpke 
     volatility  Kerstin  Stahn 
 
 14  2008  How informative are macroeconomic 
      risk forecasts? An examination of the   Malte Knüppel 
      Bank of England’s inflation forecasts Guido  Schultefrankenfeld 
 
 15  2008  Foreign (in)direct investment and 
     corporate  taxation  Georg  Wamser 
 
 16  2008  The global dimension of inflation – evidence  Sandra Eickmeier 
      from factor-augmented Phillips curves  Katharina Moll 
 
 17  2008  Global business cycles:  M. Ayhan Kose 
      convergence or decoupling?  Christopher Otrok, Ewar Prasad 
 
 18  2008  Restrictive immigration policy  Gabriel Felbermayr 
      in Germany: pains and gains  Wido Geis 
     foregone?  Wilhelm  Kohler 
 
 19  2008  International portfolios, capital  Nicolas Coeurdacier 
      accumulation and foreign assets  Robert Kollmann 
     dynamics  Philippe  Martin 
 
 20  2008  Financial globalization and  Michael B. Devereux 
      monetary policy  Alan Sutherland 
 
 21  2008  Banking globalization, monetary Nicola  Cetorelli 
      transmission and the lending channel  Linda S. Goldberg 
 
 22  2008  Financial exchange rates and international  Philip R. Lane 




 23  2008  Financial integration, specialization  F. Fecht, H. P. Grüner 
      and systemic risk  P. Hartmann 
 
 24  2008  Sectoral differences in wage freezes and  Daniel Radowski 
      wage cuts: evidence from a new firm survey  Holger Bonin 
 
 25  2008  Liquidity and the dynamic pattern of  Ansgar Belke 
      price adjustment: a global view  Walter Orth, Ralph Setzer 
 
 26  2008  Employment protection and  Florian Baumann 
      temporary work agencies  Mario Mechtel, Nikolai Stähler 
 
 27  2008  International financial markets’ influence 
      on the welfare performance of alternative 
      exchange rate regimes  Mathias Hoffmann 
 
 28  2008  Does regional redistribution spur growth?  M. Koetter, M. Wedow 
 
 29  2008  International financial competitiveness 
      and incentives to foreign direct investment  Axel Jochem 
 
 30  2008  The price of liquidity: bank characteristics  Falko Fecht 
      and market conditions  Kjell G. Nyborg, Jörg Rocholl 
 
 01  2009  Spillover effects of minimum wages  Christoph Moser 
      in a two-sector search model  Nikolai Stähler 
 
 02  2009  Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational  Iris Kesternich 
      firms and their choice of capital structure  Monika Schnitzer 
 
 03  2009  Pooling versus model selection for  Vladimir Kuzin 
      nowcasting with many predictors:  Massimiliano Marcellino 







 04  2009  Fiscal sustainability and Balassone,  Cunha,  Langenus 
      policy implications for the euro area  Manzke, Pavot, Prammer 
       Tommasino 
 
 05  2009  Testing for structural breaks  Jörg Breitung 
      in dynamic factor models  Sandra Eickmeier 
 
 06  2009  Price convergence in the EMU? 
      Evidence from micro data  Christoph Fischer 
 
 07  2009  MIDAS versus mixed-frequency VAR:  V. Kuzin, M. Marcellino 
      nowcasting GDP in the euro area  C. Schumacher 
 
 08  2009  Time-dependent pricing and 
      New Keynesian Phillips curve  Fang Yao 
 
 09  2009  Knowledge sourcing:  Tobias Schmidt 
      legitimacy deficits for MNC subsidiaries?  Wolfgang Sofka 
 
 10  2009  Factor forecasting using international 
      targeted predictors: the case of German GDP  Christian Schumacher 
 
 11  2009  Forecasting national activity using lots of 
     international  predictors:  an application to  Sandra Eickmeier 
     New  Zealand  Tim  Ng 
 
 12  2009  Opting out of the great inflation:  Andreas Beyer, Vitor Gaspar 
      German monetary policy after the  Christina Gerberding 
      breakdown of Bretton Woods  Otmar Issing 
 
 13  2009  Financial intermediation and the role  Stefan Reitz 
      of price discrimination in a two-tier market  Markus A. Schmidt, Mark P. Taylor 
 
 14  2009  Changes in import pricing behaviour: 





 15  2009  Firm-specific productivity risk over the  Ruediger Bachmann 
      business cycle: facts and aggregate implications  Christian Bayer 
 
 16  2009  The effects of knowledge management  Uwe Cantner 
      on innovative success – an empirical  Kristin Joel 
      analysis of German firms  Tobias Schmidt 
 
 17  2009  The cross-section of firms over the business  Ruediger Bachmann 
      cycle: new facts and a DSGE exploration  Christian Bayer 
 
 18  2009  Money and monetary policy transmission 
      in the euro area: evidence from FAVAR- 
      and VAR approaches  Barno Blaes 
 
 19  2009  Does lowering dividend tax rates increase 
     dividends  repatriated?  Evidence of intra-firm  Christian Bellak 
     cross-border  dividend  repatriation policies  Markus Leibrecht 
      by German multinational enterprises  Michael Wild 
 
 20  2009  Export-supporting FDI  Sebastian Krautheim 
 
 21  2009  Transmission of nominal exchange rate 
      changes to export prices and trade flows  Mathias Hoffmann 
      and implications for exchange rate policy  Oliver Holtemöller 
 
 22  2009  Do we really know that flexible exchange rates 
      facilitate current account adjustment? Some 
      new empirical evidence for CEE countries  Sabine Herrmann 
 
 23  2009  More or less aggressive? Robust monetary  Rafael Gerke 
      policy in a New Keynesian model with  Felix Hammermann 
      financial distress  Vivien Lewis 
 
 24  2009  The debt brake: business cycle and welfare con-  Eric Mayer 





 25  2009  Price discovery on traded inflation expectations:  Alexander Schulz 
      Does the financial crisis matter?  Jelena Stapf 
 
 26  2009  Supply-side effects of strong energy price  Thomas A. Knetsch 
      hikes in German industry and transportation  Alexander Molzahn 
 
 27  2009  Coin migration within the euro area Franz  Seitz,  Dietrich Stoyan 
       Karl-Heinz  Tödter  
 
34
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 
 
 01  2008  Analyzing the interest rate risk of banks   
      using time series of accounting-based data:  O. Entrop, C. Memmel 
      evidence from Germany    M. Wilkens, A. Zeisler 
 
 02  2008  Bank mergers and the dynamics of  Ben R. Craig 
      deposit interest rates    Valeriya Dinger 
 
 03  2008  Monetary policy and bank distress:  F. de Graeve 
      an integrated micro-macro approach  T. Kick, M. Koetter 
 
 04  2008  Estimating asset correlations from stock prices  K. Düllmann 
      or default rates – which method is superior?  J. Küll, M. Kunisch 
 
 05  2008  Rollover risk in commercial paper markets 
      and firms’ debt maturity choice  Felix Thierfelder 
 
 06  2008  The success of bank mergers revisited –  Andreas Behr 
      an assessment based on a matching strategy  Frank Heid 
 
 07  2008  Which interest rate scenario is the worst one for 
      a bank? Evidence from a tracking bank approach 
      for German savings and cooperative banks  Christoph Memmel 
 
 08  2008  Market conditions, default risk and  Dragon Yongjun Tang 
      credit spreads    Hong Yan 
 
 09  2008  The pricing of correlated default risk:  Nikola Tarashev 
      evidence from the credit derivatives market  Haibin Zhu 
 
 10  2008  Determinants of European banks’  Christina E. Bannier 
      engagement in loan securitization  Dennis N. Hänsel 
 
 11  2008  Interaction of market and credit risk: an analysis  Klaus Böcker 





 12  2008  A value at risk analysis of credit default swaps  B. Raunig, M. Scheicher 
 
 13  2008  Systemic bank risk in Brazil: an assessment of 
     correlated  market,  credit, sovereign and inter- 
      bank risk in an environment with stochastic  Theodore M. Barnhill, Jr. 
      volatilities and correlations    Marcos Rietti Souto 
 
 14  2008  Regulatory capital for market and credit risk inter-  T. Breuer, M. Jandačka 
      action: is current regulation always conservative?  K. Rheinberger, M. Summer 
 
 15  2008  The implications of latent technology regimes  Michael Koetter 
      for competition and efficiency in banking  Tigran Poghosyan 
 
 16  2008  The impact of downward rating momentum   André Güttler 
      on credit portfolio risk    Peter Raupach 
 
 17  2008  Stress testing of real credit portfolios  F. Mager, C. Schmieder 
 
 18  2008  Real estate markets and bank distress  M. Koetter, T. Poghosyan 
 
 19  2008  Stochastic frontier analysis by means of maxi-  Andreas Behr 
      mum likelihood and the method of moments  Sebastian Tente 
 
 20  2008  Sturm und Drang in money market funds:  Stehpan Jank 
      when money market funds cease to be narrow  Michael Wedow 
 
 01  2009  Dominating estimators for the global  Gabriel Frahm 
      minimum variance portfolio    Christoph Memmel 
 
 02  2009  Stress testing German banks in a  Klaus Düllmann 
      downturn in the automobile industry  Martin Erdelmeier 
 
 03  2009  The effects of privatization and consolidation  E. Fiorentino 
      on bank productivity: comparative evidence  A. De Vincenzo, F. Heid 





 04  2009  Shocks at large banks and banking sector  Sven Blank, Claudia M. Buch 
      distress: the Banking Granular Residual  Katja Neugebauer 
 
 05  2009  Why do savings banks transform sight 
      deposits into illiquid assets less intensively  Dorothee Holl 
      than the regulation allows?    Andrea Schertler 
 
 06  2009  Does banks’ size distort market prices?  Manja Völz 
      Evidence for too-big-to-fail in the CDS market  Michael Wedow 
 
 07  2009  Time dynamic and hierarchical dependence  Sandra Gaisser 
      modelling of an aggregated portfolio of  Christoph Memmel 
      trading books – a multivariate nonparametric  Rafael Schmidt 
     approach    Carsten  Wehn 
 
 08  2009  Financial markets’ appetite for risk – and 
      the challenge of assessing its evolution by 
      risk appetite indicators    Birgit Uhlenbrock 
 
 09  2009  Income diversification in the   Ramona Busch 
      German banking industry    Thomas Kick 
 
 10  2009  The dark and the bright side of liquidity risks: 
      evidence from open-end real estate funds in  Falko Fecht 
     Germany    Michael  Wedow  
 
37
Visiting researcher at the Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
 
The Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt is looking for a visiting researcher. Among others 
under certain conditions visiting researchers have access to a wide range of data in the 
Bundesbank. They include micro data on firms and banks not available in the public. 
Visitors should prepare a research project during their stay at the Bundesbank. Candidates 
must hold a PhD and be engaged in the field of either macroeconomics and monetary 
economics, financial markets or international economics. Proposed research projects 
should be from these fields. The visiting term will be from 3 to 6 months. Salary is 
commensurate with experience. 
 
Applicants are requested to send a CV, copies of recent papers, letters of reference and a 
proposal for a research project to: 
 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Personalabteilung 
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14 
 
60431 Frankfurt 
GERMANY 
 